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ARTICLE 3- COMMERCIAL PAPER
J. Rica~RD SKOUBY*
Effective July 1, 1965 the law of Commercial Paper in Missouri
will be governed by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code1 (UCC),
replacing the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) as it appears
in Sections 401.001 to 401.196, RSMo 1959. Article 3 expressly does not
apply to money, documents of title or investment securities, and is made
subject to the provisions of Article 4-Bank Deposits and Collections, and
Article 9-Secured Transactions.2 In addition, the definitions and princi-
ples of construction and interpretation contained in Article 1, and certain
definitions appearing in other articles, apply to Article 3.3 Thus it is clear
that Article 3 cannot be considered in isolation, but must be construed
as part of the entire UCC.
Most of the substance of the NIL has been retained in the UCC,
although it has been restated in almost completely different language
and some important changes have been made. This paper will not attempt
to investigate all of the possible effects of the departures from the NIL
in substance or language, and will not attempt to annotate Article 3,
but will be limited to brief discussions of the more obvious changes which
will affect common commercial practices. On the other hand, an attempt
will be made to construe the language of the UCC as it is written, rather
than merely paraphrasing the tranquilizing official comments.
Article 3 is divided into eight parts which will serve as convenient
divisions for discussion.
I. FORM AND INTERPRETATION
The UCC, like the NIL, contains certain formal requirements which
instruments must meet in order to be negotiable. 4 In this area the UCC
*Member of the Missouri Bar; Secretary and House Counsel, Mercantile
Trust Co., St. Louis, Mo.
1. §§ 400.3-101-.3-805, RSMo 1963 Supp.
2. § 400.3-103, RSMo 1963 Supp. A "security," as defined in § 400.8-102,
RSMo 1963 Supp., is governed by Article 8 even if it also meets the requirements
of Article 3. Note also that certain negotiable instruments secured by an interest
in goods are, by § 400.9-105(1) (b) and (g), RSMo 1963 Supp., defined as "chat-
tel paper" and, by § 400.9-102, RSMo 1963 Supp., are governed by Article 9.
3. § 400.3-102(3),(4), RSMo 1963 Supp.
4. § 400.3-104, RSMo 1963 Supp. The formal requirements of Article 3
pertain to negotiability "within this Article," leaving room for negotiability under
Article 8, and perhaps outside the UCC.
(395)
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makes one minor change. Whereas the NIL provided that the instrument
"must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time,",
the UCC requires that it "be payable on demand or at a definite time."
This will prevent the negotiability under Article 3 of instruments which
are payable at, or a certain time after, the happening of an event which
is certain to occur but indefinite as to time. It appears, however, that
this rule can be circumscribed under section 400.3-109(1)(c) by making
the instrument payable at a distant definite date subject to acceleration
upon the happening of a particular event.
The UCC considerably expands the field of provisions which an in-
strument may contain without destroying its negotiability. For example,
under section 400.3-105 an instrument may refer to or state that it arises
out of a separate agreement to which reference is made for rights as to
prepayment or acceleration, or may state that it is secured by mortgage
or otherwise. But, if negotiability is to be preserved the instrument cannot
be "subject to or governed by" another agreement. Likewise, section
400.3-112 provides that negotiability is not destroyed by a statement that
collateral has been given to secure obligations on the instrument or other-
wise of an obligor, or that the collateral is to be maintained or supplemented,
or that upon default the collateral may be realized upon.
The UCC thus substantially abandons the "courier without luggage"
concept of negotiable instruments, and recognizes the negotiability of in-
struments containing provisions commonly used today in "term loan" and
"collateral" notes. It must be remembered, however, that instruments to
be negotiable under Article 3 may contain only provisions therein specifi-
cally authorized.7
Missouri has an interesting line of cases, culminating in Illinois State
Bank v. Pedersen,8 which hold that a negotiable note and a chattel mort-
gage may be embodied in one writing, containing one signature of the
maker-mortgagor. In the Pedersen case the court concluded:
(1) the note and mortgage are considered separate instruments,
although written on one sheet of paper with a common signature,
(2) the note and mortgage are not to be considered together but
each is to be interpreted as a complete entity, (3) the note por-
tion is governed by the law merchant-the mortgage part by the
laws of property, (4) privileges in the mortgage inure to the
5. § 401.001(3), RSMo 1959.
6. § 400.3-104(c), RSMo 1963 Supp.
7. § 400.3-104(1)(b), RSMo 1963 Supp.
8. 350 S.W.2d 102 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
2
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holder only as a mortgagee and cannot be read into the note so
as to render it nonnegotiable ....
Under this decision the "courier without luggage" problem is avoided
by holding that there are two separate instruments embodied in the writ-
ing, rather than viewing the writing as a note containing "an order or
promise to do any act in addition to the payment of money," which under
section 401.005 would render the note nonnegotiable. The provisions of
UCC section 400.3-104(1) (b) that a writing to be a negotiable instrument
under Article 3 may contain "no other promise, order, obligation or power
given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article"
would not overrule the Pedersen case because the court there held that
only the note portion of the writing was negotiable-the mortgage por-
tion was to be construed as a separate instrument governed by the laws of
property. There appears to be nothing in the UCC which would change
this rule.
The UCC makes other relatively insignificant changes in the effect of
certain provisions in instruments. For example, section 400.3-105 expands
the field of instruments payable from a particular fund which are
negotiable, and section 400.3-110 considers instruments payable to the
order of an estate, trust, office or association to be order, rather than
bearer, paper. Likewise, section 400.3-115 provides for the effectiveness of
an incomplete instrument which has come into circulation even though
not delivered by the maker or drawer, without resort to a theory of
negligence or estoppel.10
A more important change from present law is made by section
400.3-121 which provides, "A note or acceptance which states that it is
payable at a bank is not of itself an order or authorization to the bank
to pay it." No reason is apparent for adopting this alternative section in
preference to one which would have preserved the present rule of section
401.087 to the effect that such a note or draft is, in itself, authority to
the bank to pay it. Under the present law, if the maker or drawer does
not desire to have the bank pay the note or draft he can so advise the
bank. Under the provision of section 400.3-121, as adopted, the bank
would not be protected in paying the note or draft on mere informal ad-
vice from a depositor, but would need a written authorization to charge
the account. In the case of a corporate depositor this would require the
9. Id. at 108.
10. Compare Clifford Banking Co. v. Donovan Comm'n Co., 195 Mo. 262,
94 S.W. 527 (1906)'; S. S. Allen Grocer Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County, 192
Mo. App. 188, 182 S.W. 777 (Spr. Ct. App. 1916).
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signatures of persons authorized to draw on the account. This could cause
delay and, in many cases, force the dishonor of the instrument. The
present law is quite well understood, and frequently used, in commercial
circles; it would seem desirable to preserve it by the adoption of the
alternative proposal.
II. TRAxSFER AND NEGOTATION
The UCC makes very few changes from the NIL with respect to
transfer and negotiation of instruments. The most important change is
rendered by section 400.3-204(1) which provides that "any instrument
specially indorsed becomes payable to the order of the special indorsee and
may be further negotiated only by his indorsement." This changes the
rule of section 401.040 that paper payable to bearer on its face may be
negotiated by delivery without regard for special indorsements. While
this change might seem reasonable on the surface, on analysis it seems
unjustified when it is realized that this allows third parties to change the
agreement made by the issuer of the paper. The issuer of bearer paper
agrees to pay the bearer without regard for the rights of intervening
owners; he does not agree to determine that the bearer is the owner or is
otherwise entitled to be paid. Under the UCC third parties can impose
upon the issuer of bearer paper the risk of paying to a person who
acquired through an unauthorized or forged indorsement.
Although very few instruments, other than those which would qualify
as investment securities under Article 8, are issued in bearer form, there
is an important class of paper in this category. Banks are issuing bearer
certificates of deposits (usually due in one year) in large amounts with
increasing frequency. These are issued in bearer form in order to facilitate
negotiation between corporations which buy and sell them as a means of
temporarily investing idle funds at a good return and minimum risk. A
considerable additional burden will be imposed by section 400.3-204(1)
upon the bank paying such an instrument if it has been specially indorsed
by an intermediate holder. To an extent, the interest rate on such a certifi-
cate of deposit is governed by the risks assumed when it is issued. This
section would allow a third party to increase the risks without increasing
the compensation. Such an invasion of freedom of contract seems inde-
fensible.
For all practical purposes the effect of conditional or restrictive in-
dorsements has been eliminated by the UCC. Section 400.3-206, provides
that a restrictive indorsement (which under section 400.3-205 includes a
[Vol. 29
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conditional indorsement) is ineffective so far as a subsequent transferee is
concerned.1' The restrictive indorsement obligates the immediate transferee
under such indorsement, but can be ignored by other parties.
The UCC in section 400.3-207 provides that a negotiation of an instru-
ment by a minor, a corporation exceeding its powers, or any other person
without capacity, is effective to transfer the instrument. The comparable
section of the NIL, section 401.022, applied only to minors and corporations.
Where an instrument is made payable to a person under a misspelled
or incorrect name, the UCC allows a person paying or giving value for
the instrument to require indorsement in both the correct and erroneous
names.12 The NIL provides that the holder may indorse in his correct
name "if he thinks fit.""' It would appear safe to say that this change con-
forms to commercial practice.
III. RIGHrs OF A HOLDER
Certain provisions in this part of Article 3 cut at the heart of com-
mercial paper. The full effect of these provisions must await years of litiga-
tion. There are, however, several apparent changes.
The UCC states in considerable detail the circumstances under which
a holder of an instrument can qualify as a holder in due course." The
full effect of these definitions is not clear, but it seems safe to say that
at least one major change is made. It appears from section 400.3-302(1) (c)
and section 400.3-304(1)(b) that a holder is a holder in due course as to
the entire instrument and all parties interested therein or he is not a holder
in due course at all. That is to say, the UCC appears to prevent a holder
from being a holder in due course as against the maker of a note if he
knows merely that some person is claiming an equitable interest in the
note through a prior holder, and would prevent a holder from being a
holder in due course as to one maker if he knew another maker had a de-
fense such as minority. 5 There would seem to be little justification for
allowing an unrelated claim or defense to prevent a holder from becoming
a holder in due course, unless the person considering the matter harbors a
basic dislike for the concept of holder in due course.
11. Compare §§ 401.036, .037, .039, .047, RSMo 1959.
12. § 400.3-203, RSMo 1963 Supp.
13. § 401.043, RSMo 1959.
14. §§ 400.3-302-.3-304, RSMo 1963 Supp.
15. Compare Meyer Milling Co. v. Strohfeld, 222 Mo. App. 1194, 4 S.W.2d
864 (Spr. Ct. App. 1928), approved in the later related case of State ex rel.
Strohfeld v. Cox, 325 Mo. 901, 30 S.W.2d 462 (En Banc 1930).
1964]
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Under section 400.3-302(2) a payee of an instrument may be a holder
in due course. This changes the stated law of Missouri,)6 but probably on a
given fact situation the same result would now be reached on a theory of
estoppel.
The "real defenses" which are available against a holder in due course
are codified in section 400.3-305. Whether there is a change made from the
present law must be determined through litigation of the language used
in the section.
The greatest departure from the NIL, and the prior common law of
negotiable instruments, is found in section 400.3-307 of the UCC. This
section eliminates the presumption that a holder of commercial paper is a
holder in due course-in fact, this section probably is effective to create a
presumption that a holder is not a holder in due course.17 There are at least
two major effects of this change.
Under section 400.3-307(3) the raising of any defense by a person
liable on an instrument will place the burden on the holder to prove he
is a holder in due course, whereas under section 401.059 the burden was
placed on the holder only when it was shown that the title of any person
negotiating the instrument was defective. A showing of failure of considera-
tion did not show a defect in title to the instrument under the NIL,"8
but it clearly is a defense which will place the burden on the holder under
the UCC.10
The other major change is that under section 400.3-307(3) the holder
has the "burden of establishing" he is a holder in due course. As defined
in section 400.1-201(8) "burden of establishing" means "burden of per-
suasion." Under the NIL the holder at most has the burden of going
forward with the evidence 2 -- if the holder puts in evidence tending to
prove he is a holder in due course, and defendant puts in no evidence
tending to prove the contrary, then the holder is entitled to a directed
verdict,2oa Until the dictum in Andres v. Browiz2°b the law of Missouri
16. Popovsky v. Griwach, 361 Mo. 1120, 238 S.W.2d 363 (1951); Town &
Country Shoe Fed. Credit Union v. Cramer, 350 S.W.2d 281 (K.C. Mo. App.
1961).
17. It must be remembered that until it is shown that a defense exists it is
wholly immaterial whether the holder is a holder in due course. A mere assignee
can recover unless a defense.is shown to exist.
18. Wohlschlaeger v. Dorsey, 206 S.W.2d 677 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947).
19. § 400.3-306, RSMo 1963 Supp.
20. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. v. Duing, 346 Mo. 896, 144 S.W.2d 69(1940); State ex rel. Stevens v. Arnold, 326 Mo. 32, 30 S.W.2d 1015 (1930); Local
Fin. Co. v. Charlton, 289 S.W.2d 157 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
20a. Local Fin. Co. v. Charlton, supra note 20, at 162.
20b. 300 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Mo. 1957).
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has always been stated to be that the holder retains the benefit of the
presumption even after defendant puts in evidence to the contrary. 20C
Even this case recognizes that only the burden of evidence shifts; it says
that the presumption goes out of the case.
Certainly any purchaser of commercial paper will be forced to review
his operations when the UCC becomes effective to determine how he will
be able to operate under the burden of presumption that he is not a holder
in due course.
IV. LiAmLITY OF PARTIES
The UCC retains most of existing law with respect to liabilities of
parties to negotiable instruments, although it makes several important
changes and in some cases changes the theory upon which the party is
liable.
The existing rule that no person is liable on an instrument unless his
signature appears thereon is retained. 21 Likewise, the UCC retains the rule
that an agent who signs without disclosing his principal and showing his
agency is liable on the instrument. 22 A possible modification of this rule
is made in that under the UCC, as between the immediate parties, the
agent may show his representative capacity if the instrument either dis-
closes the principal or indicates that the signature was made in a repre-
sentative capacity.23
A slight change in theory is effected under the UCC in that an un-
authorized signature operates as the signature of the unauthorized signer
in favor of a person who pays the instrument or takes it for value.
2
'
Thus, instead of holding the unauthorized signer liable on a warranty of
his authority, the UCC makes him liable on the instrument.25 Under the
definition of section 400.1-201(43), an unauthorized signature includes a
forgery.
The UCC in section 400.3-405 makes a substantial change, the full
extent of which must await litigation, in the effect of delivery of an instru-
ment to an imposter. This section purports to abolish all distinction be-
20c. Cases cited note 20 supra.
21. § 400.3-401, RSMo 1963 Supp. Compare § 401.018 RSMo 1959.
22. § 400.3-403, RSMo 1963 Supp. Compare § 401.020 RSMo 1959.
23. § 400.3-403, RSMo 1963 Supp.
24. § 400.3-404(1), RSMo 1963 Supp.
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tween face-to-face dealings and dealings through the mails or otherwise,
and considers all paper issued to an imposter to be fictitious payee paper.
The area of doubt as to the full effect of this provision is raised by the fact
that the section fails to explain how it is to be determined whether the
paper is issued to the imposter or whether it is issued to the named payee
and merely delivered to the imposter. Perhaps there are factual situations
where the paper is not issued at all, but is merely delivered to the imposter.
Section 400.3-102(1)(a) provides, "'Issue' means the first delivery of an
instrument to a holder or a remitter." (Emphasis added.) Section 400.1-
201(20) provides, "'Holder' means a person who is in possession of a docu-
ment of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank." Perhaps through
the use of the word "issue" in section 400.3-405 the intent of the maker or
drawer will remain pertinent, and the present rules as to imposters will not
be so drastically changed.2" Certainly, if the drafters of the UCC had in-
tended that all paper delivered to an imposter be considered fictitious payee
paper, they would have used "deliver" instead of "issue" in section 400.3-
405. Delivery is defined in section 400.1-201(14) to mean voluntary trans-
fer of possession.
A further change worth noting, although one which probably will have
little impact, is made by section 400.3-405 respecting fictitious payee paper.
Rather than regarding this as bearer paper, as is now the rule,2 the UCC
provides that it is order paper, but that any person may effectively indorse
the paper in the name of the named payee.
The UCC follows the present law of Missouri in including the situation
where the person signing as or on behalf of a maker intends the payee to
have no interest in the instrument, with the situation where the agent of
the maker has supplied the name of the payee intending the named payee
to have no interest in the instrument.28 Thus, the risk of the "padded pay-
roll" will continue to fall on the employer.
The rule stated in section 400.3-406 respecting negligence on the part
of a party to an instrument which "substantially contributes" to the altera-
tion or unauthorized signature, and precludes the negligent party from
asserting the defense, probably places a greater burden on the maker or
drawer than is placed on him by present Missouri law.29 The extent of this
26. See First Nat'l Bank v. Produce Exch. Bank, 338 Mo. 91, 89 S.W.2d 33
(1935).
27. § 401.009(3), RSMo 1959.
28. Compare § 401.009(3), RSMo 1959 with § 400.3-405, RSMo 1963 Supp.
29. Compare Scott v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (En
Banc 1938).
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change must await court interpretation of the phrase "substantially con-
tributes" and court determination of what is allowed (or required) under
"reasonable commercial standards."
The law respecting alteration of an instrument is substantially changed
by section 400.3-407 of the UCC. Whereas under the NIL any material
alteration voided the instrument,30 the UCC provides that the parties are
discharged only if the alteration is made by a holder, is fraudulent, and is
material.3, Thus, alterations made by third parties, or alterations made in
good faith by a holder do not affect the liability of parties to the instrument.
The UCC continues the rule that a subsequent holder in due course may in
all cases enforce an altered instrument in accordance with its original
tenor.
3 2
The UCC deals with the unauthorized completion of an instrument
as a material alteration, and provides that if the completion is not fraudu-
lent the instrument may be enforced in accordance with the authority
given.3s The subsequent holder in due course is given the right to enforce a
completed instrument as completed, even though the completion is
fraudulent.3 4 This is an important change in the law when taken with
section 400.3-115 which provides that an incomplete instrument can come
into circulation even without delivery by the maker or drawer. This change
in the law will deserve serious consideration by the person who has a
practice of signing checks in blank and storing them in his safe. The holder
in due course will no longer be required to prove negligence on the part of
the drawer.3 5 No amount of care exercised by the drawer will relieve him
from liability on the checks as completed if they come into the hands of a
holder in due course. Under the UCC, not only will the unfaithful employee
who has access to the checks be able to bind the maker, but the safecracker
likewise can complete and circulate the checks -at the maker's expense.
Several minor changes are made by the UCC concerning acceptance
and certification of drafts or checks.3 6 Probably the most important of these
is the requirement that the acceptance be written on the draft.? This
eliminates the acceptance embodied in a separate writing,3 8 and the accept-
30. §3 401.124, 401.125, RSMo 1959.
31. § 400.3-407, RSMo 1963 Supp.
32. § 400.3-407(3), RSMo 1963 Supp.
33. § 400.3-407, RSMo 1963 Supp.
34. § 400.3-407(3), RSMo 1963 Supp.
35. Cases cited note 10 supra.
36. §§ 400.3-410, .3-411, .3-412, RSMo 1963 Supp.
37. § 400.3-410, RSMo 1963 Supp.
38. § 401.134, RSMo 1959.
1964-
9
Skouby: Skouby: Article 3: Commercial Paper Symposium:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1964
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ance by lapse of time.89 Although a draft cannot be accepted by a separate
writing or by retention of the draft, caution will be required to prevent
equivalent liability on a theory of tort or estoppel.40
The UCC, in section 400.3-411, codifies the rule that unless otherwise
agreed a bank has no obligation to certify a check, and gives legal approval
to the practice of certifying a check before returning it for lack of proper
indorsement.
In section 400.3-416 the UCO clarifies the effect of using "payment
guaranteed" or "collection guaranteed" in connection with the signature of
a maker or indorser. A party who guarantees payment engages that he will
pay the instrument when due, without resort to any other party. The
guarantee of collection requires the holder to pursue the maker or acceptor
before looking to the guarantor. Any words of guaranty used by a party
will have the effect of waiving presentment, notice of dishonor and protest
so far as that party is concerned. Also, the question of whether words of
guaranty accompanying a signature prevents it from being an indorsement
has been answered by section 400.3-202(4) which provides that the signa-
ture is effective as an indorsement. Whether the provisions of section 400.3-
416 will supercede the provisions of sections 433.010-.22041 relating to
sureties, remains for court construction.
Several important changes are made by section 400.3-417 respecting
warranties of parties to instruments. This section imposes warranty liabil-
ity only upon those who "obtain payment or acceptance," "prior trans-
ferors" and a party who "transfers an instrument and receives considera-
tion." This relieves accommodation parties from warranty liability. The
accommodation party is liable merely in the contract capacity in which he
signs.' 2 A more significant change is the extension of warranties to the bene-
fit of "a person who in good faith pays or accepts" the instrument. Although
payment or acceptance of an instrument is final in favor of a holder in
due course, the payer receives and retains the benefit of the stated war-
ranties.43
Section 400.3-419 reverses a trend in tort law by providing that a de-
positary or collecting bank "who has in good faith and in accordance with
39. § 401.137, RSMo 1959.
40. § 400.3-419, RSMo 1963 Supp. See Thompson v. Main Street Bank, 226
Mo. App. 246, 42 S.W.2d 56 (K.C. Ct. App. 1929).
41. This statute, which is not repealed by the UCC, provides that a surety
may demand that the creditor bring suit against the principal debtor, and unless
the statute is complied with the surety is discharged.
42. § 400.3-415, RSMo 1963 Supp.
43. § 400.3-418, RSMo 1963 Supp.
[Vol. 29
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the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business" dealt with
an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one not the true owner, is not
liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of
any proceeds remaining in the bank." While the quoted language can be
litigated long and hard in each case, this section should in most cases
protect depositary and collecting banks from liability to payees arising out
of the fraud and negligence of the payee or others in handling checks. A
depositary or collecting bank will, however, remain liable, on its indorse-
ment, to the payor.4 5
V. PRESENTMENT, NoTIcE OF DISHONOR AND PROTST
The rules respecting presentment, notice of dishonor and protest have
been considerably simplified, and are set out in detail.48 Generally the rules
have been "liberalized." A person faced with a problem in this area will be
well advised to read the statutes thoroughly. It appears, however, that
any presentment or notice which would be adequate under present law
will be adequate under the UCC.
Although no major changes in practice will be required, several pro-
visions of the UCC are worthy of note.
A presentment can be effective even though the instrument is not ex-
hibited to the person on whom demand is made. 7 The person to whom
presentment is made may, however, demand exhibition of the instrument.0 8
Presentment may be made to one of several persons jointly liable on
the instrument. 9
Protest is necessary only on a draft which on its face appears to be
drawn or payable outside the United States.5 0 Protest of any other in-
strument is, however, admissable in evidence and creates a presumption of
dishonor.5 1
The officer making protest need not have personal knowledge of the
dishonor, but may act on "information satisfactory to" him.5 2
The stamp or writing of a bank, on or accompanying an instrument,
stating that payment has been refused has the effect of a protest, and is
44. Compare Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Lindell Trust Co., 348 S.W2d 558
(St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
45. § 400.3-417, RSMo 1963 Supp.
46. § 400.3-501-.3-511, RSMo 1963 Supp.
47. § 400.3-504, RSMo 1963 Supp.
48. § 400.3-505(a), RSMo 1963 Supp.
49. § 400.3-504(3) (a), RSMo 1963 Supp.
50. § 400.3-501(3), RSMo 1963 Supp.
51. § 400.3-510(a), RSMo 1963 Supp.
52. § 400.3-509(1), RSMo 1963 Supp.
1964]
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admissable in evidence to raise a presumption of dishonor of the instru-
ment.53
Under the UCC the effect of delay in presentment and notice of dis-
honor is the same with respect to a draft payable at a bank and a note paya-
ble at a bank." In either situation indorsers are discharged, and the
drawer or maker is discharged only to the extent of his loss. Under the NIL
the indorser and the drawer of a draft other than a check are fully dis-
charged;" 5 the drawer of a check is discharged to the extent of loss;", and the
maker of a note payable at a bank is not discharged at all.57
The UCC provides an interesting method by which the drawer of a
draft payable at a bank, or the maker of a note payable at a bank, may
discharge his liability on the instrument when the bank has failed during a
delay in presentment-the drawer or maker may discharge his liability by
assigning to the holder of the draft or note his claim against the bank.5s
VI. DISCeARGE
The UCC specifically provides that the discharge of a party from
liability on an instrument is a "personal defense" and is not effective
against a holder in due course who took the instrument without knowledge
of the discharge.59
Section 400.3-601(1) contains an index of the various provisions of the
UCC relating to the discharge of a party from liability on an instrument.
Some of these have been mentioned above. Some additional provisions con-
cerning discharges will be briefly discussed.
Considerable injustice could be caused by the provisions of section
400.3-604 relating to tender of payment. It is provided that a party making
tender of full payment on an instrument when it is due is -discharged to
the extent of all subsequent liability for interest, costs and attorney fees.
It is also provided that where a maker is able and ready to pay an in-
strument when and where it is payable, a tender has been made. There is
no requirement that the tender be kept open beyond the due date.
The injustice could arise in the situation where the holder of a note
failed without excuse to present the note for payment on the due date.
Suppose the maker of the note was able and ready to pay at the time and
53. § 400.3-510(b), RSMo 1963 Supp.
54. § 400.3-502, RSMo 1963 Supp.
55. § 401.070, RSMo 1959.
56. § 401.186, RSMo 1959.
57. § 401.070, RSMo 1959.
58. § 400.3-502(1) (b), RSMo 1963 Supp.
59. § 400.3-602, RSMo 1963 Supp.
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place specified. Assume further that the holder presented the note one day
after it was due and the maker refused to then pay the note, citing his
tender and his discharge from subsequent liability for interest, costs and
attorney fees. If this section is to be taken literally, the maker could force
the holder to sue on the note and, after many months of delay and much
expense to the holder, the maker could satisfy the obligation by paying
merely the face amount of the note with interest to its due date. Surely
this result would not be justified by any social policy.
The provisions of section 400.3-606 will require considerable judicial
interpretation before they become clear60 The primary point to be litigated
is the interpretation of "agrees not to sue" and "agrees to suspend.' If
"agrees" means a legally binding agreement then the section will not be a
great change from present law, but if the word is construed to include even
revocable agreements then a considerable change will be made. Probably
"agrees" will be construed to mean legally binding agreements because
the section then says "or otherwise discharges.' (Emphasis added.) This
would make it appear that the agreement not to sue or agreement to
suspend would also need to be effective as a discharge.
Another point which will be extensively litigated is the interpretation
of "unjustifiably impairs" as used in section 400.3-606(b). It hardly seems
proper to modify "impairs" with "unjustifiably." A person can justifiably
release or dispose of collateral, but it seems doubtful that a person can
justifiably impair collateral.
60. Section 400.3-606, RSMo 1963 Supp., reads:
Impairment of recourse or of collateral.
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that
without such party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue
any person against whom the party has to the knowledge of the
holder a right of recourse or agrees to suspend the right to en-
force against such person the instrument of collateral or other-
wise discharges such person, except that failure or delay in ef-
fecting any required presentment, protest or notice of dishonor
with respect to any such person does not discharge any party as
to whom presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is effective
or unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by
or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he has a
right of recourse.
(2) By express reservation of rights against a party with a right of re-
course the holder preserves
(a) all his rights against such party as of the time when the in-
strument was originally due; and(b) the right of the party to pay the instrument as of that time;
and(c) all rights of such party to recourse against others.
1964]
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VII. ADVIcE OF INTERNATIONAL SIGT DRAFTs
This part is comprised of only one section containing three subsec-
tions.1 The first subsection advises the public as to what a letter of ad-
vice is. The other two subsections recite some of the usual terms of an
agreement under which international sight drafts are drawn and paid.
Fortunately these provisions do not purport to be binding, but are effec-
tive "unless otherwise agreed."
The inclusion of section 400.3-701 in the UCC can serve only the pur-
pose of demonstrating to the world that the drafters of the UCC were
aware of some of the usual terms of agreements under which international
sight drafts are drawn and paid. Unless and until the UCC is adopted world-
wide an agreement with a foreign bank respecting the payment of drafts
will, of necessity, cover the points mentioned in this section, and in any
event many other points should be covered by such an agreement.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
This part is comprised of five sections dealing with unrelated topics.
Three of these are of major importance and will be mentioned here.
The effect of taking an instrument (usually a check) in payment of an
obligation is dealt with in section 400.3-802. This section will be of par-
ticular interest to holders of consumer installment paper who are accus-
tomed to receiving a volume of worthless checks in payment of installments.
The section will also be of interest to other creditors even though they may
be faced with the problems less frequently. The provisions of this section
require a creditor to accept a check in payment of an obligation unless
there is an agreement to the contrary. For an illustration of the mischief
this section will cause, apply its provisions to the facts of Gill v. Mercantile
Trust Co.6 2 stating the present law of Missouri. Installment creditors would
be well advised to deal with this matter in their contracts.
An ambitious innovation which affects both procedural and substantive
law is attempted in section 400.3-803. The section provides that where a
defendant is sued for breach of an obligation for which a third person is
answerable over under Article 3 of the UCC, the defendant may give
notice of the litigation to the third party and thus bind him with any
determination of fact in the case. Thus a defendant indorser could give
notice to prior indorsers and the maker and bind them with any determina-
tion of facts in the suit. The section purports to have affect without re-
61. § 400.3-701, RSMo 1963 Supp.
62. 347 S.W.2d 420 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
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gard for state or national borders. An analysis of constitutional and other
problems raised by section 400.3-803 would be completely outside the
scope of this paper.
The UCC in section 400.3-805 creates a new class of semi-negotiable
instruments which will considerably vex the commercial world until they
come into common use and are fully understood. This section provides that
an instrument negotiable in form but not payable to order or bearer, is
governed by the provisions of Article 3, except that there can be no holder
in due course of such an instrument.
At present most such instruments are issued for legitimate purposes
with the full understanding of the public that they are not negotiable, but
there are some "money orders" which are issued in this form and pass as
negotiable paper without detection. This section will benefit those who
deal with this latter class of paper, but will considerably burden those who
deal with the former.
An example of a non-negotiable instrument in common use today with
the full understanding of the public is the certificate of deposit issued by a
bank to an individual saver. These instruments are assignable so that the
payee can borrow on them, but being non-negotiable the bank can pay
them at maturity if it has had no notice of assignment even though the
instrument cannot be surrendered for cancellation."' As anyone familiar
with the business knows, many certificates of deposit are lost or destroyed.
This is not surprising when the age, business experience, and other circum-
stances of the depositors are considered. When the UCC becomes effective,
banks will be forced to make these certificates of deposit non-assignable
or will be forced to require a bond as protection when the certificate is paid
without its surrender.64 Either alternative will be a burden on the de-
positor.
The probable, and perhaps the intended, effect of section 400.3-805 will
be to increase the volume of paper which is issued in negotiable form ex-
cept for the fact it is not payable to order or bearer. People who deal with
commercial paper relying (knowingly or unknowingly) on the protection
afforded holders in due course will need to be on the alert for such paper.
IX. CONCLUSION
Article 3 of the UCC settles some minor problems, but in numerous
areas of the law the new language introduced creates uncertainty where
63. Boyd v. Sloan, 335 Mo. 163, 71 S.W.2d 1065 (1934).
64. Hochrein v. Balthasar, 361 S.W.2d 315 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
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certainty existed for many years. With the new language of the UCC the
courts will be free to completely reshape commercial law; the "white horse"
case will not exist. Whether the courts will throw the law of commercial
paper into an indefinite state similar to tort law where an "exception to an
exception" can be devised as needed to reach subjective "justice" in each
case, remains to be seen. A conservative pessimist could develop a sizeable
ulcer from contemplating the possibilities.
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